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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
PRISONERS' RIGHTS
Prison officials may face a greater possibility of
liability for violations of prisoners' civil rights if
future decisions follow Knell v. Beniin~ger.' In this
recent opinion the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
adding an alternative objective standard to its tradi-
tional subjective good faith test for liability, adopted
a standard previously established by the Supreme
Court to evaluate the acts of school officials. 2
While the plaintiff Knell was serving an eight-year
sentence for armed robbery he was placed in discipli-
nary isolation for a fifteen-day period.3 After his
release from isolation Knell appeared before an
institutional merit staff committee which revoked
three months of his accumulated statutory good time.
While in isolation Knell had requested legal mate-
rials, a typewriter, and consultation with an inmate
"jailhouse lawyer." Prison officials denied plaintiff's
requests pursuant to a then applicable prison regula-
tion. In 1972 the plaintiff filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 19834
alleging a denial of access to the courts while in
isolation and a denial of procedural due process in
prison committee hearings.5
The defendants0 were found to be free from
liability even though the new, more stringent test
1522 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1975).
2 Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
3Knell had been placed in disciplinary isolation for
writing a letter to an unauthorized person and smuggling
the letter out of the prison.
'Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States... to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
'The plaintiff filed two complaints which were con-
solidated upon appeal. The first complaint, referred to
above, requested injunctive relief and monetary damages.
The second complaint, filed almost five months later,
contested the plaintiff's loss of statutory good time and
reduction in status.
'The sole defendant at the time of appeal was Peter B.
Bensinger who was Director of the Illinois Department of
Corrections when the plaintiff's complaint was filed.
was applied.7 The appellate court quoted from Wood
v. Strickland in applying the following standard:
[I]n the specific context of school discipline, we hold
that a school board member is not immune from lia-
bility for damages under §1983 if he knew or reason-
ably should have known that the action he took within
his sphere of official responsibility would violate the
constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he
took the action with the malicious intention to cause
a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to
the student. 8
The above standard requires an objective examina-
tion of a prison official's acts; whether the prison
official reasonably should have known his acts would
violate the prisoner's rights is questioned as well as
whether he did know this. If it is determined by the
court that an official should have known his acts
would violate the prisoner's established rights, then
it is likely that he will be held liable for resulting
damages notwithstanding the fact that his intent was
not malicious and that he subjectively acted in good
faith.
Although the court in Knell acknowledged that the
Supreme Court's test in Wood was expressly limited
to the area of school discipline it applied the test to
the official conduct of correctional facility adminis-
trators for two reasons. First, the court noted that the
'The lower court had granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment in the first action; the second action was
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted. The plaintiff then appealed both cases which
were consolidated. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
vacated the district court's judgment because the plaintiff's
isolation created an effective denial of access to the courts to
challenge that isolation. 'the case was remanded to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff could prove resultant damages.
See Knell v. Bensinger, 489 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1973). On
remand Senior District Judge Perry entered judgment for
the defendants and dismissed the case on the merits. 380 F.
Supp. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
'Knell v. Bensinger, 522 F.2d at 724 (emphasis added),
quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 321-22.
'The Supreme Court in Wood did not explicitly define
good faith. In looking to precedent for guidance the Court
found that
there is general agreement on the existence of a "good
faith" immunity, but the courts have either empha-
sized different factors as elements of good faith or have
not given specific content to the good-faith standard.
420 U.S. at 315.
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Supreme Court had remanded cases involving the
personal liability of non-school officials for reconsid-
eration in the light of Wood, thereby indicating that
this standard was not to be applied exclusively to
school officials. "o Second, the basis for the Supreme
Court decision in Wood was the refusal to permit
mere ignorance of settled law to justify a denial of a
student's constitutional rights by school administra-
tors. The court in Knell also defined liability so as to
include such a situation. According to Chief Judge
Fairchild, the addition of this requirement was to
assure that officials respect the constitutional rights
of prisoners despite the need for discretion in prison
administration. 1
In applying the subjective half of this two-part test
to the treatment of Knell the court found no evidence
"Gumanis v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 1052 (1975);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In both of
these cases the Supreme Court vacated the appellate court
decisions and remanded the cases for consideration in
light of Wood v. Strickland. On remand, the issue was
whether the failure of the district judge to instruct with re-
gard to the effect of the defendant mental hospital superin-
tendent's claimed reliance on state law rendered inadequate
the trial judge's instruction as to the defendant's freedom
from liability if he acted reasonably and in good faith.
The Court in Knell also noted the adoption of this
standard about six months earlier in a case concerned with
liability of police. Glasson v. Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th
Cir. 1975). In this case police officers destroyed the protest
sign plaintiff was holding at a peaceful gathering along a
Presidential motorcade route because they determined it
would be detrimental to President Nixon. Violations of the
plaintiff's first and fourteenth amendment rights were
alleged; the Sixth Circuit held the defendants liable under
the Wood v. Strickland test. The court discarded the
traditional test because "to hold that a police officer is
exonerated from liability if he merely acts in subjective good
faith might foster ignorance of the law or, at least, encour-
age feigned ignorance of the law." 518 F.2d at 909-10.
Though the court warned against second-guessing police
officers when they are involved in potentially explosive
situations, substantial evidence in the case pointed to a
knowing and callous disregard of the plaintiff's rights. The
obvious violation of rights approaching bad faith in Glasson
was not sufficiently similar to the questionable denial of
court access in Knell to prohibit the Seventh Circuit from
citing Glasson as precedent for application of the Wood
standard.
I In reviewing acts of prison officials courts often defer
to the need for such officials to be vested with substantial
discretion in prison administration and discipline so that
they may cope with diverse situations without fear of
judicial second-guessing. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974) (certain prison discipline and proce-
dural matters were to be left to the sound discretion of state
prison officials); LaBatt v. Twomey, 513 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.
1975) (in an emergency, prison officials, reacting in good
faith, must not be unduly hindered by overbroad federal
judicial scrutiny of the factual basis underlying their
in the record disclosing subjective bad faith. 12 The
application of the objective half of the test required
an examination of the relevant law at the time the
plaintiff was placed in isolation. " At that time there
was a well established principle that the state could
not absolutely deny prisoners access to court to
challenge their confinement. '" Notwithstanding this
settled legal principle, the court, in considering
Knell's fifteen-day confinement, held that the tempo-
rary denial of access was reasonable considering the
state of the law and traditional judicial hesitancy to
interfere with internal prison administration when
no grievous interference with defendant's constitu-
tional rights was involved. "
The Wood standard with its objective components
represents an extension of earlier Supreme Court
opinions construing personal liability of government
officials under section 1983. In Pierson v. Ray'"
decisions); Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1974)
(held not within the court's province to second-guess the
judgment of correction officers by deciding later whether a
lockup was justified); Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th
Cir. 1966) (where prisoner was not permitted to keep law
books nor receive visits by his family, held that except ufi-
der exceptional circumstances federal courts will not r -
view internal prison regulations); United States ex rel.
Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963) (held
that state prison officials must of necessity be vested with
wide discretion in determining the nature and type of
medical treatment for state prisoners).
12522 F.2d at 725.
"The requirement of examining a defendant's acts in
the context of the state of the law at the time the actions
occurred is well established. See, e.g., Black v. Brown, 513
F.2d 652, 654 n.6 (7th Cir. 1975); Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d
598, 602 (1st Cir. 1974); Haines v. Kerner, 492 F.2d 937
(7th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Bracey v. Rundle, 368
F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Landman v. Royster, 354
F. Supp. 1302, 1317 (E.D. Va. 1973).
" See, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); ef.
Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961)
(inmate's right to reasonable access to courts was not
infringed upon by prison regulations which limited times
and places for legal research and restricted communications
to and from attorneys while confined in isolation).
"Concerning this judicial hesitancy to interfere with
prison administration see note 10 supra and cases cited
therein. It is possible that the remnants of this policy
influenced the Seventh Circuit's decision to find for the
defendants. By announcing the adoption of the Wood
standard yet finding no liability, the court may have
attempted to put prison administrators on notice of the
future application of this test. See United States ex rel.
Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701,719 n.38 (7th Cir. 1973).
"386 U.S. 547 (1967). In this case the plaintiffs had
attempted to use segregated facilities at a Mississippi
interstate bus terminal when they were arrested by police
for violations of the state breach-of-peace statute. The
plaintiffs brought suit under section 1983 and the common
law of false arrest.
[Vol. 67
RECENT TRENDS
the Court held that a defense of good faith and
probable cause was available to law enforce-
ment officers in a civil rights action. The Court
said that if the officers believed in good faith that
the arrest they made was constitutional, then a
verdict for the officers would follow even though the
arrest was in fact unconstitutional. The Court did
not consider whether the officers' ignorance of the
unconstitutionality of the arrest was itself indicative
of bad faith as the Knell test would seem to require.
Following Pierson the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals allowed prison officials to claim successfully
a good faith defense in civil rights actions brought by
prisoners. In United States ex rel. Miller v.
Twomev " the court held inter alia that the due
process clause required some procedural safe-
guards prior to punitive segregation of prisoners.
Where disciplinary segregation without such pro-
cedural safeguards occurred, however, prison of-
ficials were not liable for damages where no pre-
viously established procedures existed, if they
acted in good faith and performed their duties
faithfully. Since Miller imposed a previously unan-
nounced standard of conduct, the court said that it
was inappropriate to require the officials to answer
in damages. The court's decision, however, was
based on Morrissey v. Brewer' 8 in which the
Supreme Court rejected the idea that since parolees
remained in legal "custody" pursuant to criminal
convictions, they had an insufficient interest in lib-
erty to require a hearing prior to revocation. Al-
though Miller was an extension of this holding the
Seventh Circuit never considered whether prison of-
ficials should have understood Morrissey to require
additional safeguards. If this case had arisen follow-
ing Knell the lack of any attempt to institute or con-
sider procedural safeguards might have been indica-
tive of bad faith even though no malicious intent
existed on the part of officials.
In Hoines v. Kerner ", a prison inmate was denied
damages for an alleged denial of due process in
disciplinary proceedings occurring in 1968 and for
solitary confinement, the conditions of which alleg-
edly constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The
Seventh Circuit again followed Pierson v. Ray in
holding that good faith was a defense when prison
officials were sued for damages under section 1983.
According to the court, where there was a similar
prior decision in that circuit upon which officials
could rely, then the officials were said to be acting
"7See note 15 supra.
18408 U.S. 471 (1972).
19492 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1974).
in good faith. The court did not discuss whether
based upon all the factors it would have been
reasonable to expect them to act differently.
The Supreme Court reiterated the good faith
guideline for evaluating law enforcement officers'
conduct relating to an arrest in Scheuer v. Rhodes.20
This was a section 1983 case against the Governor
of Ohio and members of the Ohio National Guard
by representatives of the estates of students killed
on the campus of Kent State University. Dicta
indicated that a different standards' may be ap-
plicable to officers of the executive branch of
government and to police. The Court said:
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief
formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances,
coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for
qualified immunity of executive officers for acts per-
formed in the course of official conduct.
21
The Court neglected to provide a method for
evaluating what constituted "reasonable grounds
for belief," whether the belief must have been
reasonable to the individual executive in light of
the information he in fact had, or whether the belief
was to be examined in relation to the information
that the court felt should have been known by an
officer in a similar situation.
In LaBatt v. Twomev22 the court made no
mention of Scheuer, though it had been decided six
months earlier. In LaBatt the plaintiffs, along with
the entire prison population, had been constantly
confined in their cells for a nine-day period follow-
ing an altercation. Because there were no allega-
tions of bad faith in the warden's determination
that prison conditions required the imposition of
the lockup, the court refused further review of the
warden's actions. There was no mention of what
would have been reasonable under the circum-
stances or whether the official's behavior could
have been objectively unreasonable although sub-
jectively in good faith. 23
In conclusion, prior to Wood the decisive issue in
reviewing an official's intentional, rather than negli-
gent, acts was whether he acted in good faith or,
more specifically, whether he acted sincerely and
with a belief that his acts were legal and
20416 U.S. 232 (1974).
211d. at 247-48 (dictum) (emphasis added).
22513 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1975).23 For other cases prior to Wood allowing state prison
officials a traditional good faith defense when they were not
immune from liability see Black v. Brown, 513 F.2d 652
(7th Cir. 1975) and Fidtler v. Rundle, 497 F.2d 794 (3d
Cir. 1974).
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constitutional.2 No specific intent to deprive the
prisoner or the accused of his constitutional rights
was required for liability.2 5
The Supreme Court in Wood, after adopting the
subjective-objective standard, remanded for consider-
ation the issue of whether two high school students
had been deprived of procedural due process when
they were expelled from school for violating a school
regulation prohibiting the use or possession of
alcoholic beverages at school activities. The District
Court said that no malice or ill will by the officials
toward the students, necessary for liability under
"4See generally, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308
(1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Bell v.
Wolff, 496 F.2d 1252 (8th Cir. 1974) (no liability where
warden, who allegedly compelled a pretrial detainee to
work, had a good faith belief that the plaintiff wanted to
work rather than remain idle); Gaffney v. Silk, 488
F.2d 1248 (1st Cir. 1973) (town selectmen not liable for
terminating disability payments to former policemen
when their actions were- in good faith and they did not
subjectively realize that they would deprive plaintiffs of
federal rights); Skinner v. Spellman, 480 F.2d 539 (4th
Cir. 1973) (in prison disciplinary proceeding official not
liable for damages if he acted in reasonable good faith
reliance on what was standard operating procedure in
the Virginia prisons); United States ex rel. Miller v.
Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 719 n.38 (7th Cir. 1973);
Joseph v. Rowlen, 402 F.2d 367 (7th Cir. 1968)
(police officer who acted in good faith and with probable
cause in making arrest under statute he believed to be
valid was not liable for deprivation of arrestee's civil
rights although the statute was later held invalid);
Preston v. Cowan, 369 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1973)
(where defendant blocked mailing of plaintiff's motions
to Supreme Court he had to prove that he believed
that his conduct was constitutionally permissible in order to
escape liability).
"See, e.g., Hoitt v. Vitek, 497 F.2d 598, 602 n.4 (1st
Cir. 1974) (a viable complaint challenging a post-emer-
gency lockup need not contain an allegation of specific
intent); Dowsey v. Wilkins, 467 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1972)
(where plaintiff was repeatedly threatened and questioned
by police it was not necessary for him to show malice or ill
will to recover); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir.
1970), noted in 23 VAND. L. REV. 1341 (1970) (gross or
culpable negligence created liability); Whirl v. Kern, 407
F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1969) (ignorance of sheriff who
unlawfully detained plaintiff in jail created liability for
damages); cf. Jenkins v. Meyers, 338 F. Supp. 383 (N.D.
11. 1972), affd without published opinion, 481 F.2d 1406
(7th Cir. 1973) (where prison officials failed to mail a trial
transcript to the plaintiff's attorney, court held that while
specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right was
not essential to a finding of liability, the act leading to the
deprivation must have been an intentional rather than a
negligent one). But cf Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 272 (3d
Cir. 1972) (to hold defendants liable court said plaintiff
must prove at least the condition usually demanded in a tort
action, which is existence of either wrongful intention or
culpable negligence).
section 1983, was present. 26 The Court of Ap-
peals disagreed; it held that specific intent to harm
wrongfully was not a requirement for recovery of
damages.2 7 The court held that the test should be
objective rather than subjective.
The Supreme Court attempted to combine these
two decisions to fashion a standard which would
allow officials leeway in exercising discretion in
disciplinary matters, yet which would not leave the
rights of students wholly unprotected. In order to be
immune from liability for damages under section
1983 the Court said that a school board member
"must be held to a standard of conduct based not
only on permissible intentions, but also on knowl-
edge of the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights
of his charges." " A board member's nonmalicious
ignorance of the rights of his students at the time of
the event will not save him from liability under the
Wood standard. "'
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Wood
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals approved the
use of this subjective-objective standard to evaluate
the acts of prison officials. In an addendum to the
opinion in McCray v. Burrell"5 the court quoted
Wood and, without discussion, found that standard
consistent with the evaluation of liability in the body
of the McCray opinion. Where an inmate alleged
inter alia that his confinement in the prison mental
observation cell constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment the court remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the prison guard who placed him
there was liable for damages."
The pre- Wood standard first used by the McCray
court to determine liability required a prison guard
to act in reliance on a good faith belief that his
acts were constitutionally permissible. This belief
rendered him immune from damages even if it vwere
later established that his belief was ill-founded. It
26348 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Ark. 1972).
27485 F.2d 186 (8th Cir. 1973).
21420 U.S. at 322.2Uustice Powell, joined by three other Justices in his
dissent, objected to the adoption of harsher standard than
that previously used because it appeared to rest on an
"unwarranted assumption" as to what law officials know,
or can know, about legal and constitutional rights. 420 U.S.
at 328-29 (Powell,J., dissenting).
30516 F.2d 357, 372 (4th Cir. 1975).
"Questions to be considered on remand included
whether the defendant had a continuing duty toward the
plaintiff after placing him in the mental observation cell;
whether there was a duty to the plaintiff to take further
action when the psychiatrist failed to respond to the
prison's calls; and whether there were other, more humane
facilities to which the plaintiff could have been transferred
when the psychiatrist failed to respond. Id. at 371.
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would seem necessary, before proclaiming these
standards consistent, to compare the requirement
of a good faith belief with Wood's denial of im-
munity if the official should have known that his
acts would violate the constitutional rights of the
affected individual. It is possible that these two
standards are not compatible; the former may only
require an examination of the individual's reasons
for his belief and action while the latter looks to an
external standard for guidance as to what the of-
ficial should have known and done. Though the
Fourth Circuit's adoption of Wood in the addendum
to McCray is probably indicative of the future ap-
plication of this standard, a conflict with the earlier,
supposedly consistent standard of liability used in the
main part of the McCray opinion may exist. This
leaves the Seventh Circuit in Knell v. Bensinger as
the only circuit court clearly embracing the subjec-
tive-objective standard in relation to the acts of
prison administrators. 32
Prison officials and administrators may find it
difficult to distill from Knell the standard of conduct
required of them by the Seventh Circuit. The court
stated in Knell the conduct expected:
[I]n exercising their informed discretion officials must
be sensitive and alert to the protections afforded pris-
oners by the developing judicial scrutiny of prison
conditions and practices."
In this case the court said that the plaintiff failed to
allege or establish a policy of absolute deprivation of
effective access to the courts as was forbidden under
then existing percedent. The court found that the
temporary deprivation of access while the plaintiff
was in disciplinary isolation was de minimis and
justified by the exigencies and considerations of
prison discipline; controlling weight was given to the
administrator's discretion. The court stated that its
policy underlying immunity for public officials was
the necessity of insuring principled and conscien-
tious governmental decision making by affording some
measure of freedom from fear of personal liability for
the official exercise of discretion and the performance
of required duties."
Neither the court's policy nor treatment of the issue
U2The next extension of this standard may be in its
application to the negligent acts of officials. In Knell v.
Bensinger the court said that the Supreme Court in Wood
v. Strickland attempted to insure that "careless disregard or
negligent ignorance of clear constitutional rights and duties




of liability offer any specific, detailed guidance to
prison officials desirous of avoiding liability.
Consideration of a different fact situation in light
of Knell may provide some insight into what may
now be expected of officials. If a case such as Poin-
dexter v. Woodson 35 had arisen following Knell in
the Seventh Circuit rather than in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, it may have been decided differently. In this
case inmates of the state penitentiary brought a civil
rights action against state prison officials seeking an
injunction and monetary damages arising from their
being tear gassed, sprayed with water hoses, and
confined in "strip cells" or solitary confinement
following a prison riot. The court found the of-
ficials not liable for damages because it was within
their discretion to deal with the situation in a
reasonable manner and no evidence of malice was
present. The court said that the use of these cir-
cumstances constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment. "
Following Knell an appropriate question in a case
such as Poindexter may be whether the officials
should have known that this punishment, long after
the riot occurred, was cruel and unusual punishment
and violative of the prisoners' established rights; if so,
then they might have been held liable for damages
notwithstanding lack of malice or the use of normal
discretion. If one could expect the reasonable ad-
ministrator to be aware that this course of punish-
ment was unlawful, the objective branch of the Knell
good faith test would not be satisfied, and the prison
administrator would be held liable for any resulting
damages. However, the reliance of the court in Knell
on the state of established law and well-known legal
principles indicates that a prisoner will have diffi-
culty collecting monetary damages when the viola-
tion of a right involves ramifications that may be
beyond the legal understanding of the official.
In conclusion Knell v. Bensinger follows in the
wake of Wood v. Strickland and represents an
extension of the tests for liability of prison officials
for violations of prisoners' rights. The standard,
however, was not strictly applied and the prison
administrator escaped liability. Nevertheless, the
adoption of this standard portends a trend toward
more frequent personal liability of prison officials
when the court, proceeding with both objective and
subjective standards of required conduct, believes
that the officials should have known that their acts
were constitutionally impermissible.
35510 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1975).
3 No injunction was issued in this case because the
unlawful disciplinary methods were no longer in use. Id.
at 465.
